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INTRODUCTION
Artists generally portray the figure of Justice as a blindfolded
woman bearing a sword and scales. In To Serve and Protect: Privatiza-
tion and Community in Criminal Justice, Bruce L. Benson, a prolific
and distinguished economist at Florida State University,' uses eco-
nomic analysis to reveal Justice to be an entrepreneur. Restoring Jus-
tice to her historical role as businesswoman is the key to Benson's
prescription for what ails the criminal justice system.
Justice as entrepreneur? Isn't "Justice" (with a capital "J" at least)
a deep philosophical concept? What about all those ideas first year
law students debate: retribution, deterrence, and restitution? What
could economics possibly say about justice that would be useful?
Quite a bit, as it turns out. As an economist, Benson studies the
incentives for all the participants in the criminal justice system (in-
cluding criminals, victims, police, defense lawyers, prosecutors, prison
guards, judges, jurors, and parole officers). His focus on incentives-
developed through examination of historical and comparative law ex-
amples as well as through a comprehensive survey of empirical work
on crime and criminal justice -provides the overall framework for the
book. Understanding incentives is a valuable substitute for philoso-
phy.
t Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Regulation and Law and Associate Dean for Aca-
demic Affairs, Case Western Reserve University; Senior Associate, Political Economy Research
Center, Bozeman, Montana.
1 Benson has written or cowritten numerous articles and two other books on legal topics.
The books are The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State (Pacific Research Institute 1990)
and The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War (Rowman & Littlefield 1994) (with David W. Ras-
mussen).
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The relative lack of competition among law and economics
scholarship enhances the value of this book. The economic analysis of
law has something to offer in most fields of legal scholarship, but law
and economics scholars have neglected criminal law. The most recent
edition of Richard A. Posner's definitive treatise, for example, offers
only one and a half chapters on criminal law and procedure, and much
of that draws primarily on scholarship from the 1970s and 1980s.'
(Benson authored or coauthored a significant portion of the
scholarship that does exist on the subject.')
Part I discharges the basic responsibility of a book reviewer to
discuss the non-substantive characteristics of the reviewed book that
will matter to potential readers. Parts II and III examine the content
of Benson's analysis of criminal justice with respect to the role of pri-
vate actors in public crime control and the theory and practice of pri-
vate crime control. Part IV uses the example of the late nineteenth-
century open range cattle industry in Texas and Wyoming to test Ben-
son's analysis against an historical example. Part V looks at Benson's
prescriptions for policy change and concludes by assessing the benefits
of Benson's analysis for the public policy debate over criminal justice
reform.
I. THE REVIEW BASICS
The rest of the Review will try to convince you that the benefits
of reading To Serve and Protect are large; this Part will tell you why
the costs of reading it are low.4 Well written books are less costly to
read than poorly written books. Academics in general and economists
in particular are not known for lowering readers' costs. This, however,
is a well written book. Benson has a lively and engaging style of writ-
ing. If the book has a flaw in the writing, it is that there are too many
quotes from writers whose styles (at least in the quoted selections) are
neither. The book is well produced, with a thorough index and only a
few typographical or other production errors. The extensive references
2 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law ch 21-22 (Aspen 5th ed 1998) (discussing
criminal procedure and law enforcement).
3 I found forty-nine references to papers written by or coauthored by Benson in the bibli-
ography of To Serve and Protect. Since there are papers not referenced there, this bibliographic
listing represents only a subset of Benson's output.
4 This is also the appropriate place to make disclaimers. I know Bruce Benson, have par-
ticipated in a number of conferences with him, and have been familiar with his work for over ten
years. Along with quite a few others, I read and commented on a portion of this book when it
was in manuscript form. Benson also used a manuscript of mine, analyzing private provision of
law in the nineteenth-century American West, as a minor source for the book. (The manuscript
was subsequently published as Andrew P Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen: Overcoming
Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 Land & Water L Rev 581 (1998).)
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provide a valuable resource for others interested in the economics of
almost any aspect of criminal justice.
Benson also thoroughly researched and documented the book.
He provides an exhaustive survey of factual information on every-
thing from the operation of the modern bail bond system to the de-
velopment of the criminal justice system in medieval England. I would
be surprised if there is a significant empirical study of any relevant as-
pect of the criminal justice system that he failed to cite or discuss.
Although this book is an economic analysis of criminal justice, it
is remarkably free of economic jargon and mathematical obfuscation.
Benson clearly and concisely explains each important economic con-
cept he uses. There are no graphs and few equations or tables. A
reader without a background in economics will find the book valuable
as an introduction to economics as well as accessible as a policy analy-
sis of criminal justice.
While most of the book is an objective application of economic
principles to issues of criminal justice, the final third is a series of pol-
icy prescriptions aimed at the primary audience for the book: people
working to improve the criminal justice system. The book would also
be useful in a law and economics course or in a criminal law seminar.
Outside the academy, anyone interested in criminal justice issues will
find the book both provocative and an invaluable guide to the empiri-
cal criminal justice literature.
One final note for readers: this book is part of a series entitled
"The Political Economy of the Austrian School." Austrian economics
is a subfield of economics, which, despite the name, is not about or
practiced primarily in the country of Austria As a distinct subfield,
Austrian economics first developed as a response to socialist eco-
nomic theory.6 Well known Austrian economist and Nobel laureate
Friedrich Hayek wrote extensively on legal issues Austrian econom-
5 The name derives from the significance of several key figures of Austrian nationality:
Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek. The main academic enters of Austrian
economics today are New York University and Auburn University. The Foundation on Economic
Education, in Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, and the Ludwig von Mises Institute, in Auburn,
Alabama, are also centers of Austrian inquiry.
6 The Austrians, for example, "won" the "socialist calculation debate" against market so-
cialist theorists like Oscar Lange. See Trygve J.B. Hoff, Economic Calculation in the Socialist So-
ciety (Liberty 1981). The Austrians successfully demonstrated that without decentralized mar-
kets, the information problems in calculating how to allocate production and consumption could
not be solved in an efficient manner. See .G.R. Steele, The Economics of Friedrich Hayek 96 (St.
Martin's 1996).
7 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago 1978); Friedrich A. Hayek,
1 Law, Legislation and Liberty:A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political
Economy: Rules and Order (Chicago 1973); Friedrich A. Hayek, 2 Law, Legislation and Liberty:
A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy: The Mirage of Social
Justice (Chicago 1976); Friedrich A. Hayek, 3 Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of
the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy: The Political Order of a Free People (Chi-
2001]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ics today often examines the role of entrepreneurs and generally es-
chews the mathematical formalism associated with modern economic
theory. Benson's book fits within this tradition since it emphasizes the
importance of entrepreneurial activity and property rights. A reader
previously unfamiliar with the nuances of the Austrian school will not,
however, notice anything particularly unusual about the economics in
the book other than its extraordinary readability.!
II. THE PRIVATE ROLE IN PUBLIC CRIME CONTROL
Discussions of the private role in public crime control often cen-
ter on the need for privatization of particular services. Most people as-
sociate the term "privatization" with the practice of contracting with a
private sector firm to provide a service previously provided by a pub-
lic entity. Indeed, the term "privatization" suggests both that the status
quo is not private and that the end result of the process will be private.
In the first part of the book, Benson explains how this understanding
of "privatization" creates a misleading picture.
There is certainly a great deal of "privatization" going on in
criminal justice, from private prisons to contracting out certain police
services to private firms. But Benson distinguishes true privatization
from simply hiring a private entity to provide public services, which he
terms "contracting out."
[C]ontracting out is, at most, only partial or incomplete privatiza-
tion. The determination of what is going to be demanded from
and produced by the firm under contract remains in the political
arena, under the influence of interest groups and public officials
rather than under the direct control of private citizens acting as
individual buyers. Complete privatization in criminal justice in-
volves private-sector control over all of the decisions regarding
the use of resources devoted to the protection of persons and
property (p 15).
The distinction matters because Benson argues that all govern-
ment services involve a degree of contracting out. First, "[e]verything
that the government allegedly produces is actually produced by con-
tracting with private entities" (p 16). Government employees, like po-
lice officers, are simply individuals with whom the government has an
cago 1979).
8 See, for example, Israel M. Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process ix-xi (Chicago
1985).
9 Indeed a review of the book in an Austrian journal criticized it for being insufficiently
Austrian. See Laurent Carnis, Review, To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in
Criminal Justice, 2 Q J Austrian Econ 89, 91 (1999) ("A more narrow class of problems [with the
book] is connected with Benson's neoclassical economic outlook.").
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individual employment contract. Contracting with Richard Roe to be
a police officer or Sally Smith to be a prison guard is thus no different
in concept from contracting with Roe Protective Services, Inc or Smith
Private Prisons Co. This is an important part of Benson's overall ar-
gument for increasing the role for private actors in criminal justice. If
all government action involves contracting with private entities, then
"the normative view that government must be the only organization
with police and punishment powers, for fear that private entities might
abuse such powers, really does not make much sense" (p 16). Second,
governments are increasingly contracting out for criminal justice ser-
vices, including police and security services, corrections services, and
even court services, as Benson documents in Chapter 2 (pp 15-25). We
need to realize that this is not true privatization because Benson
wants us to have a discussion about whether contracting out goes far
enough.
Understanding government actions as merely different forms of
contracts helps as well. What matters in any government contract is
the incentives the contract creates.'° If a contract between the govern-
ment and a private entity rewards the private entity for increasing a
particular outcome or cutting costs, then we can expect that the pri-
vate entity, regardless of whether it is an individual or a corporation, is
going to increase the outcome or cut the costs.
Public and private contracts differ in the incentives they create.
Private actors bear the risk of loss and gain the potential for profit;
public employees are (in general) immune from losses and forbidden
to reap the rewards of their actions (p 17). Private firms are restricted
by competition; on the other hand, public entities compete largely
with other public entities for a share of the budget. "Private firms
must persuade customers to buy their product rather than the product
of the competition by offering a price/quality mix that consumers find
to be equal to or better than the price/quality mix offered by someone
else" (p 27). Governments, on the other hand, "can coerce taxpayers
into buying something they do not want" (p 27). Combined with "the
rigidities of most civil servant employment systems, which are domi-
nated by people most concerned with job security, increasing wages
and other benefits, avoiding risks and responsibility, and lowering
their personal costs of doing the job, the inefficiencies of government
production are not too surprising" (pp 27-28).
Contracting out can solve some, but not all, of these problems. By
shifting production of various criminal justice functions to a private
10 This point is consistent with the growing neoclassical economic literature on the various
forms of government contracting. See Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incen-
tives in Procurement and Regulation (MIT 1993).
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entity, the distortionary effects of public employment contracts can be
removed. Private entities also have the ability to profit by innovating
ways to reduce costs, and so contracting out can also increase innova-
tion. Benson examines several cases where private contractors were
able to innovate in prison construction and operation and police secu-
rity services (pp 28-34). In one of the best examples, Benson examines
how the Corrections Corporation of America has innovated in prison
design to reduce operating costs. By eliminating a single post requiring
continuous staffing (which would require five employees to staff 24
hours a day, 365 days a year), five employee positions could be elimi-
nated, saving over $100,000 per year (p 31).
The great fear with contracting out is that firms will express their
entrepreneurial instincts through relentless cost-cutting that will lead
to reduced quality. Critics of private prisons, for example, argue that
privately run prisons will skimp on prisoners' medical care and food to
increase profits (p 35). As Benson notes, however, whether quality-
enhancing or quality-decreasing competition results depends in part
on the structure of the contract with the private firm. For example,
paying court-appointed defense attorneys a flat fee per case will not
encourage them to provide a vigorous defense but rather to maximize
volume (p 39). Paying them per hour of work, however, will encourage
public defenders to defend their clients vigorously (and perhaps over-
zealously).
Unfortunately, the same bureaucratic incentives that affect gov-
ernment production of criminal justice services affect government
production of contracts for criminal justice services (pp 42-44). If bu-
reaucrats cannot deliver the criminal justice services efficiently, there
is little hope that they will deliver efficient contracts with private par-
ties.
One example of the problems caused by relying on bureaucrats
to write contracts with private parties is the potential for corruption in
awarding the contracts. "When entrepreneurs recognize that contracts
are going to be awarded on the basis of bribes paid to public officials,
they tend to respond to these incentives" (p 45). Corruption can take
many forms, including political contributions in return for contracts.
However, if corruption exists in contracting out, it is also likely to exist
elsewhere in the system, and so eliminating contracting out is unlikely
to eliminate the problem (pp 44-46).
A final reason to be concerned about contracting out is the ends
to which the contracts harness the efficiency of the market. Contract-
ing out lowers the cost of purchasing criminal justice services through
the government. In other words, for a given quantity of tax dollars, the
government will be able to imprison more people (or the same people
for longer) if it contracts out the actual running of the prisons. As
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Benson notes, when a government pursues an immoral end, making
the process more efficient is undesirable (p 47). We can thus be thank-
ful that murderous modern despots like Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, and
Mao have been devotees of central planning. Concern over this point
extends closer to home as well. The drug war is an excellent example
of an area where increased efficiency may produce only more efficient
rights violations." The major insight offered is that the public debate
over contracting out misses a crucial point about the existing criminal
justice system: private inputs are, and have always been, a necessary
component of the production of criminal justice services.
These private inputs are subject to distorted incentives by the
public sector's role. For example, many victims and witnesses do not
report crimes.2 Benson argues that people do not report crimes be-
cause the criminal justice system fails to provide them with the incen-
tive to do so (pp 54-56). The incentives for victims come, in large part,
from the punishment imposed on the perpetrator. Because of the
flaws in the public portion of the system, these incentives for victim
cooperation are attenuated.
Not only do victims not receive restitution, they experience sig-
nificant costs if they pursue justice. "The cost to victims of reporting a
crime and then cooperating with prosecution can be staggering"
(p 54). Victims risk retribution, bear the emotional costs of confront-
ing the defense attorney, are often poorly treated by prosecutors, incur
considerable out-of-pocket costs to attend court sessions, and have lit-
tle certainty about the benefits of cooperating (p 54).
While victims experience high costs from participating in the sys-
tem, criminals experience shockingly low costs. Discounting for the
various uncertainties in crime reporting, arrest, prosecution, convic-
tion, and imprisonment, Benson shows that (relying on his earlier
work) the expected prison term for burglary in Florida in 1992 was
12.8 days (p 69). Criminals are unlikely to be engaged in calculations
of such precision, but their experience can hardly fail to miss such
dramatic disparities between nominal and expected sentences. The
combination of high costs for victims and low costs for offenders is
telling evidence that the criminal justice system is failing and, more-
11 Benson has cowritten an article on the incentive effects for police of civil forfeiture laws,
which he does not discuss at any length in this book. Brent D. Mast, Bruce L. Benson, and David
W. Rasmussen, Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, 104 Pub Choice 285,303-04
(2000) (discussing the shift in police resources from non-drug related crimes to drug related
crimes).
12 U.S. government statistics suggest that only 39 percent of the most serious crimes are re-
ported (p 50). These "Index I" crimes include murder, manslaughter, sexual offenses, aggravated
assaults, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
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over, that it is failing because of its inadequate provision of incentives
for private inputs.
By the end of the first part of the book, the reader will see that
"public" provision of criminal justice services is actually dependent on
significant private inputs, that the public portion of the production of
criminal justice services is subject to significant incentive problems,
and that the public portion of the production raises the cost of private
participation. In the second part of his book, Benson turns to truly
private systems for providing criminal justice services as substitutes
for public systems that utilize some private inputs.
III. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PRIVATE CRIME CONTROL
Private crime control is a reality today in many ways.3 Businesses
design buildings to be resistant to attacks by criminals (p 79); indi-
viduals adopt safer driving habits (varying routes, locking doors)
(pp 76-77) and buy guns (p 77); both hire private providers of security
services (pp 79-80); and private groups engage in volunteer efforts
against crime (pp 80-83). When crime control efforts are properly
seen as including this broad range of activities, private crime control
efforts dwarf public efforts under any measure.
There are also examples of more comprehensive privatization.
The St. Louis metropolitan area, for example, has more than four
hundred private street-providing organizations, covering a mix of
wealthy and less wealthy neighborhoods (p 85). These streets stand
out among the many private streets in the United States because they
were public streets that were privatized in response to neighborhood
demand (p 84). San Francisco has sixty-five "private police beats,"
which are "owned" by private groups (p 86). The private groups bid
for the right to provide security services in the designated area. De-
spite multiple attempts by the city police to do away with these or-
ganizations, they have survived since 1851 (p 86).
Given the demand for secure environments, it should come as no
surprise that entrepreneurs are selling products that satisfy this de-
mand." Gated communities are an obvious example, but Benson also
13 Private crime control is not new. Specific forms, such as gated communities, may be new,
but private criminal justice traces its history to colonial times. "Government law enforcement
was not the norm in the original thirteen colonies" (p 94). In colonial times, public courts were
often far from where people lived, and so private, restitution-based alternatives developed.
Neighbors assisted victims in pursuit, in part because they knew that they might require similar
assistance themselves in other instances (p 95).
14 Benson documents how extensive private providers of civil justice have become today
(pp 113-16). Just as private providers, such as arbitrators, have moved in to supply civil justice in
response to the failures of the state legal system, Benson argues that entrepreneurs also offer al-
ternatives in the criminal justice sector. He finds extensive evidence that volunteer groups are
engaged in just such activities in inner city neighborhoods. Community groups in Philadelphia
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describes enclosed shopping malls and office complexes as security
innovations. "The incentive to design facilities with security in mind
and to provide adequate levels of security for both businesses and
their customers is very strong when a mall or office complex owner
must compete with other malls and office buildings to attract busi-
nesses" (p 92). While these developments offer other advantages as
well, one crucial difference between a mall and a city street is that the
mall is private property owned by a single entity that can exclude oth-
ers (p 92). The importance of the ability to exclude highlights the cru-
cial point that the legal environment affects the viability of private so-
lutions. Evaluations of the success or failure of private solutions must
therefore consider the broad legal environment within which those so-
lutions are attempted. Given the many problems with our current le-
gal environment identified by Benson, we must consider whether
problems with private solutions are due to their private nature or to
aspects of the legal environment. Benson's analysis thus provides a
powerful reason to be skeptical of criticisms of privatization proposals
in the criminal justice area.
Benson also examines historical evidence of private criminal law
provision. For example, there is powerful evidence that the western
frontier was not a violent, lawless place. Economic historians Terry
Anderson and EJ. Hill, for example, have documented numerous cases
of cooperative behavior built on property rights including land clubs
and wagon trains." John Umbeck has exhaustively surveyed California
gold rush mining camp records and found that the forty-niners regu-
larly chose contractually created property rights over violence." Ben-son thoroughly surveys the evidence and prior work in this area
(pp 97-106)."7
The most troubling bits for advocates of private provision of
criminal justice services are the various episodes of western vigilan-
tism. The consensus view of western vigilantism today is that it was a
bad thing. For example, Richard Maxwell Brown, the most prominent
and Washington, D.C. have successfully reduced drug-related crime in several neighborhoods,
despite the disadvantage of not being in the position of the owners of public spaces (pp 120-24).
For a variety of reasons, private justice services are not as widespread as private security services,
but the evidence seems clear that such services are possible.
15 See Terry L. Anderson and P.J. Hill, An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism:
The Not So Wild, Wild West, 3 J Libertarian Stud 9,26-27 (1979); Terry L. Anderson and Peter J.
Hill, The Not So Wild West (unpublished manuscript on file with author). I have also written in
this area. See Morriss, 33 Land & Water L Rev at 592-625 (cited in note 4); Andrew P. Morriss,
Private Actors & Structural Balance: Militia & the Free Rider Problem in Private Provision of
Law, 58 Mont L Rev 115, 130 (1997); and Andrew P. Morriss, Law on the Range: Private Provi-
sion of Law Among the Plains Cattle Kings (unpublished working paper on file with author).
16 John R. Umbeck, A Theory of Property Rights: With Application to the California Gold
Rush 4-5 (Iowa State 1981).
17 1 discuss one example he does not discuss at greater length in Part IV.
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of the "new western history" writers on this topic, argues that vigilan-
tism was part of the violent "Western Civil War of Incorporation"
fought by capital against labor, minorities, and other disadvantaged
and oppressed groups." Vigilantism had "[a]t its core ... the conserva-
tive, consolidating authority of capital."" Against this backdrop, when
modern opponents of private efforts at providing criminal justice ser-
vices label such efforts "vigilantism," they are scoring a public rela-
tions blow. Benson cuts against the popular consensus on vigilantism
and reinterprets several western incidents as private provision of law.'
Critics of vigilantes are correct that some (and perhaps many) of
the individuals who called themselves "vigilantes" were simply thugs
violating the rights of their victims. The history of vigilantism in the
American South is primarily a history of campaigns of terror aimed at
violating the rights of African-Americans in an effort to return them
to a status of de facto slavery.2 Simply labeling terrorists as vigilantes,
however, does not change their essential nature as terrorists. Applying
the same label to legitimate private efforts at crime control likewise
does not make those efforts illegitimate.
In many respects, the vigilance committees are the most prob-
lematic examples of privately produced law. To the extent they are
disorganized, they run the risk of degenerating into mere mobs, with
all the attendant losses of accuracy and deliberation that entails. As
they become more organized, however, they begin to look uncom-
fortably like a state, often without any checks and balances. Evaluat-
ing decentralized institutions and movements based on whether some
who claim adherence to the movement violate the rights of others is
slippery ground, however. Just as all police are not the Los Angeles
Police Department, not all vigilantes were thugs with a fancy name.
Benson takes a fresh look at this issue.
The possibility of private crime control is not enough, however.
To complete the case for private provision of criminal justice services,
18 Richard Maxwell Brown, Violence, in Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A. O'Connor, and Mar-
tha A. Sandweiss, eds, The Oxford History of the American West 393,393-96 (Oxford 1994).
19 Id at 396.
20 Benson focuses on the two San Francisco vigilance committees of 1851 and 1856 and the
Montana vigilance committee of 1863-64. In these three instances, he argues, vigilantes were pri-
vately providing services that the public authorities could not or would not provide (pp 106-11).
Benson is right on the theory and right about the Montana vigilantes, but only partly right about
the San Francisco vigilantes. The 1851 committee was an organization devoted to privately pro-
viding criminal justice services due to the failure of the public authorities to do so. The 1856
committee was a coup d'etat. See Morriss, 33 Land & Water L Rev at 627-35 (cited in note 4).
21 The same is true of some modern heirs of the western vigilantes. The "common law
courts" movement, for example, was criminals engaged in fraud who found it convenient to con-
ceal their fraud with pseudo-legal window dressing. See id at 691-94.
22 See Ray Abrahams, Vigilant Citizens: Vigilantism and the State 95-100 (Polity 1998) (de-
scribing how the Ku Klux Klan used vigilantism to maintain white supremacy).
[68:551
Returning Justice to its Private Roots
supporters of private provision must also show that private provision
is desirable. Benson catalogues an impressive collection of privatiza-
tion's benefits. He informs his discussion with theory, empirical evi-
dence, and a comparative institutional analysis of private and public
provision of such services.
Benson begins with the fundamental economic fact of scarcity,
which implies that some means of rationing services is necessary.
"'[J]ustice' provided through the public sector is always rationed-it
must be because it requires the use of scarce resources" (p 131). Ben-
son then compares public and private means of rationing criminal jus-
tice services. Public rationing requires three steps. First, the public
provider must gather and process information on the relative desires
of constituents for criminal justice and other services. Second, the pub-
lic provider must decide how to allocate the services produced. Third,
the public provider's actions must be monitored (pp 128-31).3
Economic analysis and public choice analysis suggest that all of
these areas are problematic for public providers of criminal justice
(and other) services. For example, how are public officials to deter-
mine whether citizens prefer more police patrols or more prison
spaces (or more environmental protection or other services)? Voting
gives an imperfect measure-one must vote for a "bundle" of posi-
tions when selecting a candidate (p 129). In short, in the political
"marketplace" one cannot select one candidate's (or party's) position
on one issue (drug criminalization) and reject her position on another
(the death penalty). Similarly, since public rationing is not by willing-
ness to pay, it must rely on alternative measures of demand. Do ser-
vices go to those willing to wait for them (for example, courts ration
access by requiring litigants to wait for a trial) or to interest groups
according to political influence (for example, there are more police
patrols in affluent neighborhoods)?
Benson develops an excellent example to show how alternative
rationing systems affect the criminal justice system (p 135). Judges
have a set of punishments available to them ranging from prison sen-
tences to parole. Judges (and prosecutors) face no costs for using pris-
ons but accrue political benefits from signaling that they are "tough on
crime" by handing out stiff prison terms (p 135). Sentencing a con-
victed defendant to prison thus confers only benefits on the judge
while bestowing both costs and benefits on society. Even more impor-
tantly, judges concerned with the response of their community have an
incentive to sentence harshly because a defendant sent to prison is
23 Monitoring raises an interesting set of issues. If a public employee, such as a prosecutor,
must prove to the electorate that she is doing a good job, she has an incentive to focus on compil-
ing a record that "proves" she is doing a good job. Prosecutors thus have an incentive to "pursue
the easiest cases and ration through plea bargaining" (p 133).
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unlikely to harm the local community (even if his imprisonment costs
the state significant resources). Judges will thus overutilize prison sen-
tences because prison sentences are unpriced.
Benson's key insight, however, is not that too many criminals will
go to jail. It instead is that because "there is no price to signal the rela-
tive merits of imprisoning the two offenders," judges will fail to gauge
the impact of their decisions to sentence a new offender to prison
(p 136)."4 Thus, in a world with scarce prison space, the constant influx
of new prisoners causes the early release of existing inmates (p 136)."
The alternative to public rationing is market rationing, and mar-
kets ration by prices. Consumers can buy products to fit different
needs, rather than facing an "either/or" bundle requirement as in the
political marketplace. The result is a different set of incentives for con-
sumers, with regard to gathering information and making decisions,
compared to the incentives for voters:
[Clonsumers buying in markets have very strong incentives to
gather information, compared to the motivation of tax-
payer/voters in the political arena, because the individual con-
sumer receives the benefits from a good decision (the purchase
of a product that truly provides more satisfaction than any alter-
native purchase, given the consumer's money income, or number
of votes, and the money prices of alternatives). The consumer
also bears the cost of a bad decision (the purchase of a product
that gives less satisfaction than some alternative would have pro-
vided, given money income and prices).... Therefore, consumers
benefit directly from any time, effort, and expenses invested in in-
formation gathering and evaluation that increase the likelihood
of a good decision. Furthermore, they have access to much better
information than voters do (p 143).
The crucial difference between markets and politics is thus not that
participants in one institution are better behaved or more altruistic
than participants in the other. Rather the distinction is that competi-
tive markets have a feedback mechanism that allows decentralized
decisionmaking; governments do not.
This feedback produces differences in incentives and thus in the
way services are produced. For example, customer price sensitivity
means private providers of criminal justice services need to achieve
24 Benson also provides a similar story about how legislators' incentives lead to
overcrowding through the lack of a price mechanism for legislation creating new crimes or
stiffening penalties (p 136).
25 Benson gives a series of chilling examples of dangerous prisoners who, after release to
create prison space for new, less dangerous criminals, went on to commit additional violent
crimes (pp 136-38).
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cost efficieficies. One way to do so is through the division of labor.
Amarillo, Texas, for example, allowed a private firm to respond to se-
curity system alarms, rather than requiring the public police to do so
(p 150). The private firm substituted specialists in alarm response for
full police response. This saved the police department an estimated
3,420 person-hours or eight alarm calls per day. Since the private firm
was able to utilize less expensive personnel to respond to the alarms,
the overall cost was lowered (p 150). By providing different levels of
services for different prices, entrepreneurs can expand consumers' op-
tions.
The final piece of the argument is Benson's response to the mar-
ket failure argument. Suppose you are right, one can imagine a critic
responding to Benson, suppose the government is as bad as you say it
is. But isn't the market just as bad or worse? Benson responds to four
main market failure arguments: (1) the profit motive will produce "too
much" cost cutting and thus poor quality services; (2) private entities
will abuse their power; (3) markets favor the rich; and (4) criminal jus-
tice services are a public good and will therefore be underprovided in
the marketplace (pp 169-70).
A. Profit Motive and Cost Cutting
Benson's response to the cost cutting argument echoes his earlier
discussion of privatization. How an entrepreneur will respond to mar-
ket demands for criminal justice services depends on the incentives
the entrepreneur faces. So long as the customers want quality services
(such as police protection), entrepreneurs lack incentives to compete
by lowering quality (pp 171-74).26
B. Abuse of Power
The abuse of power argument against a market system is a seri-
ous issue, as discussed above in connection with the vigilance commit-
tees. Benson identifies the underlying problem as one of coerced mo-
nopoly. Only when an entity can prevent exit can it safely abuse its
victims (p 177)." The problem of abuse of power is thus largely an in-
stitutional failure of monopolies, not competitive markets.
26 Quality arguments often mask a different agenda. For many, such as public sector un-
ions, quality is equal to fully trained police even though fully trained police are not necessary for
many criminal justice services (for example, being night watchmen or responding to burglar
alarms) (p 172).
27 For example, why do victims not "exit" protection rackets by reporting the crimes in-
volved to the public police (pp 177-78)? Because corrupt rackets have access to economies of
scale in corrupting public criminal justice authorities (p 178).
This appears to create an opportunity that private security entrepreneurs would seize, and
in fact individuals and firms who employ reputable private security firms are not likely to
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The fact is that many individuals, whether publicly or privately
employed, might abuse their positions by cutting costs, doing
poor quality work, and bullying-if they can. The institutional ar-
rangements within which people perform their tasks determine
whether or not such abuses can be carried out, and competitive
markets supply one of the best (if not the best) institutional ar-
rangements for discouraging abusive, inefficient behavior
(p 179).2'
C. Favoring the Rich
Markets do favor the rich. Markets provide more goods and ser-
vices and greater choices to those with more resources to purchase
them. The same is true, however, of political "markets." The real ques-
tion, then, is whether the poor will be able to procure better or more
criminal justice services in a market context than they can in a politi-
cal context.
Benson offers two reasons why the poor would fare better in a
market-based system than in the current political one. First, if a pri-
vate system provided for transferable property rights to restitution,
the poor would be able to sell their claims to more powerful interests
(p 184). Those interests would then ensure that justice was done (in
other words, that the perpetrator paid).29 Second, the poor represent
an untapped market at present (p 185). There is already evidence that
some entrepreneurs are providing poor communities with criminal
justice services at low cost and making a profit doing so (pp 185-86).
The poor may not get as many criminal justice services as the rich in a
market-based system, but they will get more than they do now.
D. Underprovision of Public Goods
Benson makes an important distinction that undercuts the public
good argument against a market system. Publicly provided criminal
justice services are not a public good but a common access resource
(p 190). The difference is subtle but important. In a public good provi-
sion problem, the issue is persuading individuals to contribute towards
the provision of the good. Individuals rationally refrain from doing so
because they can secure the benefits of the good even if they do not
pay much in the way of extortion (except to the organization that has so much power that
individual private security firms cannot stand up to it-the state) (p 178).
28 Benson provides a short list of examples of state abuse of criminal justice powers as a
further argument that this is not a market failure so much as a problem of monopoly (pp 179-
84).
29 This is what happened in medieval Iceland. See David Friedman, The Machinery of
Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism 204 (Open Court 2d ed 1989).
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contribute0 In a common-pool problem, the issue is rationing access
to the common-pool resource.3 Since publicly provided criminal jus-
tice services are already being provided, victims face the common-
pool problem of capturing the existing resources, not the public good
problem of funding the services. The distinction is important because
of the consequences for the solution.
The public-goods terminology seems to imply ... that nonexclud-
ability is an intrinsic problem that cannot be resolved without co-
ercing free-riders into paying for the service. The common-pool
terminology emphasizes that incentives arise because of the
existing definition of property rights and therefore that another
property rights assignment can alter such incentives (p 191).
By clarifying the terminology, Benson effectively undercuts one of the
major arguments against market provision of criminal justice services.
In the first two-thirds of the book, Benson proposes a theory
about criminal justice services that suggests the following: where mar-
kets can provide such services, criminal justice services will be pro-
vided at lower cost and with greater innovation and more justice than
where those services are publicly provided. I now turn to a brief case
study from the nineteenth-century American West to test this hy-
pothesis.
IV. A TEST CASE: THE OPEN RANGE CATTLE INDUSTRY
Between 1865 and the end of the nineteenth century, an immense
range cattle industry appeared across central North America, ulti-
mately stretching from Texas north into Canada. Some regions, like
Texas, developed stable institutions and orderly societies. Others, like
Wyoming, degenerated into open warfare between "cattle kings" and
small settlers. Although Texas's and Wyoming's cattle industries
shared many characteristics, they also differed in significant respects.
These differences illuminate the conditions under which the private
production of criminal justice services can succeed.
The open range cattlemen's need for law stemmed from fungible
cattle roaming across large expanses of land. Free-roaming cows were
easy to steal and hard to police. Moreover, policing them required
specialized services that did not benefit the general public. Simply
providing more cops on the general beat was thus not enough -the
beneficiaries of the services provided to the cattlemen were largely
only the cattlemen themselves.32 The primary cost of public provision
30 That is why most listeners do not contribute to public radio stations, for example.
31 Overstocking a common pasture (the "tragedy of the commons") is the classic example.
32 In contrast, an urban homeowner lobbying for increased public provision of crime detec-
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of criminal justice services for the cattlemen was the cost of procuring
the services. The relevant government had to be persuaded to adopt
the necessary rules and then to appropriate the resources required to
enforce the rules. We should expect the cattlemen to have chosen pub-
lic provision whenever the cost of lobbying for the services was less
than the cost of private provision. The question is thus when are the
costs of lobbying for public provision going to be less than the costs of
private service provision?
Livestock associations33 offered the cattlemen both a private al-
ternative to public provision of criminal justice services and a means
of collective action for lobbying. "These livestock associations exer-
cised real government functions. The rules and regulations adopted by
them were respected as law and were obeyed as faithfully as the stat-
utes of any legislative body." 3, They confronted problems, such as raids
by Indians, through cooperative efforts."
In Texas, private property rights in land were available, lowering
the cost of private efforts. The state government was relatively costly
to capture because of competing political interests, making the cost of
procuring public provision of those services relatively high. Wyoming,
on the other hand, lacked private property rights, raising the costs of
private provision. In Wyoming "the stock-growing industry was in full
command of the law-making department,..6 thus lowering the cost of
public provision. In 1890, for example, eight of twelve members of the
upper house of the legislature were members of the cattlemen's asso-
ciation." As a result, the association often appeared to treat the terri-
torial and state governments as instruments of power to gain advan-
tages over farmers and small cattlemen.
tion and prevention services for his home could argue that his neighbors would share in the
benefits.
33 Wyoming stockmen organized in 1873. Helena Huntington Smith, The War on Powder
River 26 (McGraw-Hill 1966). Northern Texas cattlemen organized in 1877, uniting with other
regional groups a few years later. Paul I. Wellman, The Trampling Herd 251 (Carrick & Evans
1939).
34 James McClellan Hamilton, From Wilderness to Statehood:A History of Montana 1805-
1900 404 (Binfords & Mort 1957).
35 Losses to Indians during 1880-81, for example, led a meeting of western Montana
stockmen to offer rewards for the capture and conviction of traders selling alcohol to Indians.
Paul C. Phillips, ed, 2 Forty Years on the Frontier: As Seen in the Journals and Reminiscences of
Granville Stuart 156 (Arthur H. Clark 1925). The associations also hired their own guards to
"look after Indians." Id at 157.
36 A.S. Mercer, The Banditti of the Plains or The Cattlemen's Invasion of Wyoming in 1892
[The Crowning Infamy of The Ages] 11 (Oklahoma 1954). See Ernest Staples Osgood, The Day
of the Cattleman 42 (Minnesota 1929) (Wyoming's story was so intertwined with the growth of
the cattle industry "that the story of one is to a very large degree the story of the other.").
37 Smith, The War on Powder River at 85 (cited in note 33).
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A. Property Rights and Private Provision
Control of land was central to the cattlemen's ability privately to
provide criminal justice services. Raising range cattle took a great deal
of land-Texas longhorns, the primary type of cattle in the early days
of the cattle kingdom, commonly ranged far enough to require "three
or four hundred square miles of grazing territory, extending in all di-
rections' from water sources."
When the first cattlemen arrived in the various parts of the cattle
kingdom, the land was empty. With the land technically owned by the
federal government, the state government (in Texas), Indian tribes, or
with unclear ownership, newcomers often simply helped themselves to
whatever portion they desired." Thus, a man who wished to become a
rancher rode until he found open country and chose a headquarters,
usually along a stream. Within a few years, men with herds often num-
bering in the thousands turned their unsupervised cattle loose onto
public lands in the fall to fend for themselves in the winter and gath-
ered them in a spring roundup, collecting their increase."'
Federal land policy in the West created three important problems
for the cattlemen. The first was that under federal policy they could
not legally obtain sufficient land for cattle raising." Cattle raising re-
quired a minimum of four sections of land for an economically viable
herd in the plains, for example, and only a quarter of that could be le-
gally obtained.2 The difference with Texas is illustrated by the units
38 Wellman, The Trampling Herd at 31 (cited in note 33).
39 Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains 228 (Ginn and Co 1931).
40 T.A. Larson, History of Wyoming 164-65 (Nebraska 1965).
41 One solution to the problem of the unavailability of legal title was simply to take posses-
sion without regard to title. Cattle kings who bought railroad land, which alternated with public
land along railroad rights of way, often simply fenced the public land with their adjacent prop-
erty to reduce fencing costs. Id at 179. By 1887, for example, almost 250,000 acres of public land
had been fenced illegally in Montana alone. Joseph Kinsey Howard, Montana High, Wide, and
Handsome 108 (Yale 1959). Illegal fencing reached its peak in the mid-1880s and declined after a
vigorous federal law enforcement campaign against the practice. Larson, History of Wyoming at
179-80 (cited in note 40). Federal officials went to work removing illegal fencing and cleared
135,000 acres in Montana during 1887. Howard, Montana High, Wide, and Handsome at 109.
The cattlemen also tried creative methods. For example, one rancher purchased a railroad
land grant composed of the odd numbered sections of a Montana township. Working with the
owners of the even sections outside the township, he fenced the entire thing entirely on private
land but enclosing the public sections as well. Another left openings on a lake and into an im-
passable coulee, arguing there was no complete enclosure. Both lost in court. Id.
42 Webb, The Great Plains at 393 (cited in note 39); Black's Law Dictionary 1356 (West 7th
ed 1999) (A section is a parcel of land containing 640 acres.). Indeed, Webb suggests that "little
attention" was devoted to the size of the unit of land to be provided. Webb, The Great Plains at
407. Even as early as 1875, the federal General Land Office reported to Congress that "title to
the public lands cannot be honestly acquired under the homestead laws" in the West. Report of
Commissioner of General Land Office, H Exec Doc 1, pt 4, 44th Cong, 1st Sess 7 (1875). When
the Congress finally did adjust the size of parcels available upward in the Desert Land Act of
1877, 19 Stat 377 (1877), codified as amended at 43 USC §§ 321-39 (1994), there was still insuffi-
The University of Chicago Law Review
used by the surveys: Texas's arid lands were initially surveyed into
4,428 acre tracts in 1881, rather than 640 acre sections used by federal
43surveys.
Second, federal land policy was based on a survey grid that took
no account of the topography of the land or the availability of water.
Dividing the arid lands of the West with a grid into square sections left
many without access to water.4
Third, federal policy encouraged homesteading, an activity in-
compatible with range cattle and one that introduced a group with no
incentive to follow customary norms.4' The same homestead law that
denied cattlemen adequate range "served as an effective bait which
lured the farmers" west.6 Worse, homesteaders eeking protection for
their crops against the cattle fenced off access to water, severely
handicapping cattle's ability to survive. Use of water for irrigation re-
duced the available water in streams and rivers for cattle as well.
An important consequence of the absence of private property in
land was the lack of incentives for privately providing services like law
enforcement. The vast distances and sparse population of the plains
made it costly to provide law enforcement services. The government
resources that were available, such as military posts, were often busy
with other tasks such as enforcing federal Indian policy. As a result,
public provision of criminal justice services on the northern plains was
limited. Private provision was also limited. Without the ability to ex-
clude people from the range, the only protective services possible
were guarding the cattle or ex post investigations to support prosecu-
tions.
Texas followed quite different land policies from the federal gov-
ernment. Texas used its lands, particularly the vast tracts of arid Pan-
handle and west Texas range, to fund projects, granting individuals and
syndicates land as payment. Because "[m]ost of the grantees of these
lands needed money more than they needed land," they put their
holdings on the market, allowing investors to purchase large consoli-
cient recognition of the differences between arid and humid lands.
43 J. Evetts Haley, The XIT Ranch of Texas:And the Early Days of the Llano Estacado 51
(Oklahoma 1953).
44 Howard, Montana High, Wide, and Handsome at 34-35 (cited in note 41).
45 It is important to be clear about what was not the problem of the open range-its ap-
propriation by private individuals. From the Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat 392, codified at 43
USC §§ 161 et seq (1891), land policy in the United States was based on the idea that the public
interest was best served by providing free land to settlers and gaining "the increased national
prosperity and increased property values" that would result. Webb, The Great Plains at 404 (cited
in note 39). Government revenues would come from taxes on prosperity, not from sale of lands
(as they had before 1862). Id. That quite a bit of the public domain ended up in private hands
was a shared national goal, not an objection to the cattlemen's appropriations.
46 Webb, The Great Plains at 317 (cited in note 39).
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dated tracts.7 The state also leased public lands for grazing.M Charles
Goodnight, for example, was able to purchase enough land to create
the 1,335,000 acre JA Properties. The XIT ranch (so named because it
covered part or all of ten counties - "Ten in Texas") was created when
its owners "traded" a three million dollar state capitol building for
three million acres.49 The development of barbed wire allowed these
tracts to be fenced and so by 1882 Panhandle ranchers could not only
buy land, they could effectively exclude others.0
Where ranchers were able to get title to or lease land, they used
their control to impose law and order.5' As J. Evetts Haley concludes
in his history of the XIT, in a region so remote that the "law was so
distant as to be impotent, 'the [capitol] Syndicate' was bringing devel-,,12
opment, law, and a measure of promise out of the desert. The XIT
imposed a code of behavior in 1888 that forbade gambling, carrying
six-shooters, keeping private horses, running ame with XIT horses, or
drinking. It also warned cowboys "Don't steal a beef for us! If you do
we'll fire you."3 When the Texans had problems with law and order, it
was often due to poor management and agency problems.' Since the
Texas ranches were owned outright, their owners were able to inter-
nalize the benefits of law production and, not surprisingly, produced
more of it than the northern plains ranchers.
47 J.C. McNeill III, The McNeills' SR Ranch: 100 Years in Blanco Canyon 10 (Texas A&M
1988).
48 W.M. Pearce, The Matador Land and Cattle Company 24 (Oklahoma 1964).
49 Wellman, The Trampling Herd at 281-83 (cited in note 33). The Texas legislature thought
it had gotten the better of the deal and took pride "in driving such a hard trade with a 'bunch of
Yankees."' Haley, The XIT Ranch at 5 (cited in note 43).
50 McNeill, The McNeills' SR Ranch at 10-11 (cited in note 47). When the XIT obtained its
land and began fencing it, it spurred the Panhandle's other outfits to take similar measures. The
XIT's fence cut the LS outfit off from range it had used in Deaf Smith County, for example, and
the LS took steps to acquire title to land as well. Dulcie Sullivan, The LS Brand: The Story of a
Texas Panhandle Ranch 95-96 (Texas 1968). Because both the XIT and the LS held legal title to
land, they were also able to solve boundary conflicts by trading land. Id at 96. Even where Texas
had previously promoted settlement, cattle companies were frequently able to buy out settlers.
Pearce, The Matador Land and Cattle Company at 23 (cited in note 48).
51 Lewis Atherton, The Cattle Kings 43-44 (Indiana 1961) (discussing the prohibition on
alcohol, gambling, and fighting at certain ranches).
52 Haley, The XIT Ranch at 104 (cited in note 43). Ownership also brought investment in
other improvements-the XIT ranch, for example, began fencing almost immediately and ulti-
mately spent more than $180,000 on its outer fence alone. Id at 87-88; Wellman, The Trampling
Herd at 289 (cited in note 33). The LS maintained a pack of seventy-five greyhounds to hunt
wolves, investing in both a "mush-pot wrangler" to care for the dogs and improved kennels. Sul-
livan, The LS Brand at 151-52 (cited in note 50).
53 Haley, The XIT Ranch at 116 (cited in note 43).The Matador company imposed similar
rules. Pearce, The Matador Land and Cattle Company at 39-40 (cited in note 48).
54 For example, the XIT's early problems with rustling "largety grew out of the gross care-
lessness if not the sympathy of the first general manager." When he was replaced by a more
competent manager, the situation rapidly improved. Haley, The XIT Ranch at 109-11 (cited in
note 43).
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The availability of legal title in Texas also produced a different at-
titude toward settlement and farming. The Texas Panhandle ranches
encouraged settlement because their owners realized they could profit
from selling land to small holders. The XIT, for example, was owned
by the Capitol Syndicate that envisioned its ultimate profit coming
from land sales and viewed ranching as a stop-gap." Similarly the
Espuela Land and Cattle Company promoted colonization: Even
companies initially opposed to colonization, like the Matador, eventu-
ally came to see the potential economic gains." Having title also made
resort to the civil legal system a realistic alternative to violence-the
Matador company, for example, relied heavily on eviction proceedings
to protect its range.58
The cattle kingdom's experience with land is a textbook example
of the impact of incentives on individual behavior." Where the cattle-
men were able to obtain legal title to the land necessary to develop
their interests, they used private property rights to amass land hold-
ings. These holdings allowed them to internalize the benefits of pro-
viding services such as law enforcement. They were also able to inter-
nalize the benefits of development, leading to quite different attitudes
toward settlement.
The second important lesson from the experience .is the impor-
tance of externally imposed incentives on the ability of people to gen-
erate privately produced legal regimes. Again, the Texans largely suc-
ceeded because they were able to exclude other interests from the
Texas range. The Wyoming ranchers not only could not exclude others,
but were also subjected to a federal policy that actively encouraged
immigration by people with incompatible interests. Had the Wyoming
ranchers not faced the early competition by federally subsidized set-
tlers, they might have had time to develop lasting customary institu-
tions.
B. Rustling
Rustling was a serious problem with range cattle. Cattle turned
loose on the range could be identified by branding and ear cropping,6
55 Id at 71.
56 McNeill, The McNeills' SR Ranch at 60 (cited in note 47).
57 Pearce, The Matador Land and Cattle Company at 122 (cited in note 48).
58 Id at 26.
59 The difference is apparent in the histories of the northern plains and Texas cattle opera-
tions. Texas cattlemen are described in a host of case studies of particular ranches like the XIT or
SR Ranch. McNeill, The McNeills' SR Ranch (cited in note 47); Haley, The XIT Ranch (cited in
note 43). Montana and Wyoming cattlemen are not; instead, their histories are written as the his-
tories of the industry.
60 The main individual means of protecting ownership in cattle was branding, an imperfect
means of identifying property. Brands could be altered, although cattlemen chose brands to pre-
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but a cow converted to beef was almost impossible to identify. Cattle
theft was thus hard to prove ex post. Although before improved stocks
were introduced individual cattle were not particularly valuable, and
some degree of appropriation of another's cattle was tolerated," rus-
tling was much more than simply taking a steer here and there for
dinner. Rustlers were highly organized in many instances. Wellman,
for example, recounts how rustlers would earmark range cattle with
the true owner's mark and turn them loose, in hopes the earmark
would ensure the marked cattle would be skipped in the next
roundup. The rustlers could then brand them and remark the ears at
their leisure. Similarly rustlers would "brand" cattle with the correct
brand, but apply it so lightly that it would not alter the hide. After the
calf's hair shed, it could be rebranded. Stopping rustling thus re-
quired relatively sophisticated measures.
To enforce their property rights in cattle, cattlemen sometimes
hired men to provide additional police services to supplement he in-
adequate activities of the state and local authorities. For a time, the
Wyoming Stock Growers Association fielded a force of up to twenty-
one private detectives on the range and private inspectors at shipping
terminals to combat thefts, but financial pressures forced them to re-
strict severely these activities by the late 1880s.6' Rustling was hard to
control through the formal legal system in part because the habits of
the earlier times, when it was no crime to eat another's beef, persisted
among juries and in part because the law was often physically too dis-
tant.
Like the northern plains cattlemen, Texas Panhandle ranchers
were also plagued by well-organized rustlers. The Texans took several
vent this. Wellman, The Trampling Herd at 244 (cited in note 33). Increasing the size and com-
plexity of the brand, however, not only risked damaging the hide but took more time to apply.
Thus, one early Texas rancher named Ace Jenkins branded his cattle with "a huge A on the
shoulder, a C on the ribs, and an E on the flank." Id at 34. If a ranch was large and strong enough
to keep off rustlers, it did not need a complex brand-the King Ranch, for example, used only a
simple running "W." Id at 245. Even an altered brand could be read in some circumstances-
viewed from the inside, the original brand stands out, although "checking" a brand this way
could obviously be costly. Haley, The XIT Ranch at 123 (cited in note 43).
61 "Ranchers on the Northern plains recognized grim truth as well as humor in the
universal story of the stranger who arrived in a community leading a steer from whose progeny
he rapidly developed a whole herd of cattle." Atherton, The Cattle Kings at 33 (cited in note 51).
For similar accounts, see J. Frank Dobie, The Longhorns 40 (Little, Brown 1941); Wellman, The
Trampling Herd at 232 (cited in note 33); Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman at 104 (cited in
note 36).
62 Wellman, The Trampling Herd at 248-50 (cited in note 33).
63 Larson, History of Wyoming at 187-89 (cited in note 40).
64 Haley, The XIT Ranch at 106 (cited in note 43). Rustlers also relied on perjurers to es-
cape justice. Id at 124.
65 Sullivan, The LS Brand at 87 (cited in note 50). The high level of organization by the rus-
tlers was in part a reaction to the ranches' more developed property rights-snatching a cow out
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steps to control rustling: they obtained the governor's permission to
hire "Home Rangers," men with official status but paid by the local
ranch (the men hired included Pat Garrett, who went on to be sheriff
of Lincoln County, New Mexico and kill Billy the Kid); purchased ad-
vanced weapons that improved their men's ability to shoot rustlers
(the LS bought twelve 8mm Mannlicher Austrian Calvary guns, for
example, capable of shooting accurately a quarter mile); and an-
nounced policies of shooting on sight at strangers spotted on ranch
land without authorization." These measures proved effective. Be-
cause they owned their ranges, Texas ranchers were able to deploy
such strategies successfully.
Although rustling was a serious problem across the northern
plains, Wyoming stockmen were convinced they faced a particularly
serious problem. In particular they thought that local juries' sympa-
thies for local defendants made obtaining a conviction almost impos-
sible in the counties in north central Wyoming." A lack of credibility
on the part of Association stock detectives among the general public
also made convictions hard to secure-one juror reportedly told a
prosecutor after a trial that he would not convict a dog on the basis of
the testimony of such liars."' Failure to secure convictions led the As-
sociation's leaders to "the dangerous conviction that everybody was
out of step but themselves-the press, the public, the juries, the
judges."' 9
Several members of the Wyoming Stock Growers Association
determined that "a lynching bee" was the way to resolve the conflict.
An invasion of Johnson County in north central Wyoming by a com-
bination of hired gunmen and trusted employees was chosen as the
best method70 and planned for at least a year."' Heavily armed and
of a mixed herd on the unfenced public range in Wyoming was far easier than getting one from
within the vast XIT, for example.
66 Id at 87-88,151; Haley, The XIT Ranch at 112 (cited in note 43).
67 Larson, History of Wyoming at 189-90 (cited in note 40). The cattle kings were right that
jury sympathy sometimes made it difficult to convict rustlers, although they exaggerated the ex-
tent of the conviction problem. The Association's problems in obtaining convictions were not
caused by juries being made up of rustlers, but because most settlers believed "that the Associa-
tion operated on the principle of one rule for me and another rule for thee. The average citizen
believed that stock-law violations were winked at when committed by favored members, while
the same 'mistake' if made by an ordinary fellow would lead to his arrest." Smith, The War on
Powder River at 71 (cited in note 33). Smith and Mercer recount a number of incidents in which
prominent Association members violated the law with impunity. Id at 71-75; Mercer, The Ban-
ditti of the Plains at 14 (cited in note 36). As a result, "[t]he cowboys were thoroughly disaffected
by this time, even in sympathy with the rustlers and they had no intention of interfering." Smith,
The War on Powder River at 151.
68 Smith, The War on Powder River at 81 (cited in note 33).
69 Id.
70 Larson, History of Wyoming at 271-72 (cited in note 40).
71 William H. Kittrell, Foreward, in Mercer, The Banditti of the Plains at xxix (cited in note
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using a special twelve car train, the "Regulators" headed north from
Cheyenne to Casper.' The organization of the train "required great
skill in organization and implied support in high places in the State,
from the railroads, and in the army and War Department as well.""3
Amazingly, the invasion force included two newspaper eporters."
After an unplanned day-long siege of the KC ranch that netted
them only two "dead rustlers" and allowed their approach to be spot-
ted, the Regulators found themselves pinned down. They managed to
get word to their supporters of their predicament. Wyoming's two
Senators, Joseph M. Carey and RE. Warren, both allied with the cattle
kings, personally joined acting Governor Barber's appeals, reportedly
getting President Benjamin Harrison out of bed to order out the fed-
eral troops." Although the federal troops rescued the Regulators from
the angry citizens and took them into custody, the Regulators escaped
unpunished through a variety of legal maneuvers.16
C. Evaluating the Cattlemen's Experiences
The experiences of the cattlemen in these two jurisdictions differ
with respect to the level of violence. The level of violence was lower in
Texas and higher in Wyoming. Innocent peoples' rights were rarely
violated in Texas and frequently violated in Wyoming.
Part of the explanation for this difference lies in the differing in-
centive structures provided by the legal system. Land laws in particu-
lar were important. The northern plains suffered under laws that
36).
72 Sam Travers Clover, On Special Assignment Being the Further Adventures of Paul
Travers: Showing How He Succeeded as a Newspaper Reporter 234-35 (Argonaut 1965). The in-
tentions of the men behind the invasion were made clear by interviews they gave in Denver
while the invasion was in progress. Convinced their forces would triumph, one member of the
"prominent cattlemen" told the Cheyenne Daily Tribune, "I am willing to give all the assistance
possible to any body of men which will attempt to exterminate the rustlers." Mercer, The Banditti
of the Plains at 35 (cited in note 36). H.B. Ijams, secretary of the Wyoming Board of Livestock
Commissioners told another reporter that the invaders included some of "the best citizens of the
whole state" who were going to Johnson County for "retribution." Id at 36-37.
73 Kittrell, Foreward at xxx (cited in note 71). Helena Huntington Smith concludes that the
evidence confirms participation by many of the leading men of the state. Smith, The War on
Powder River at 193 (cited in note 33). John Clay, a prominent cattleman, later wrote that the
planners "were backed by every large cattleman in the state and behind them they had the moral
influence of the two senators, Warren and Carey." Id. Certainly the invaders did not believe that
the official legal system would offer a serious threat of punishment.
74 Smith, The War on Powder River at 197 (cited in note 33). Planning for the invasion in-
cluded manipulation of the press. "A spate of articles began reaching the press of the nation, de-
nouncing what was referred to as the 'reign of terror' in Johnson County." Id at 180.
75 Mercer, The Banditti of the Plains at 76 (cited in note 36); Smith, The War on Powder
River at 224 (cited in note 33); Larson, History of Wyoming at 278 (cited in note 40).
76 Mercer, The Banditti of the Plains at 71, 132-33 (cited in note 36); Smith, The War on
Powder River at 225-26 (cited in note 33); Larson, History of Wyoming at 278 (cited in note 40).
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were persistently broken in the West because they were not made
for the West and were wholly unsuited to any arid region. The
homestead law gave a man 160 acres of land and presumed that
he should not acquire more. Since a man could not live on 160
acres of land in many parts of the region, he had to acquire more
or starve."
The incentive structures influenced the private institutions that the
cattlemen used to solve many of their problems. They could not over-
come the handicap that the homestead laws imposed, and so could not
control access to the commons. "Not only were absurd laws imposed
upon them, but their customs, which might well have received the
sanction of law, were too seldom recognized. The blame for a great
deal of western lawlessness rests more with the lawmaker than with
the lawbreaker."78 Further, as Webb notes, "All legislation was made in
favor of the farmer; none was ever made for the cattleman, so far as
the disposal of the public domain was concerned, except in Texas.
'79
The impact of the incentives provided by the government legal sys-
tems undermined the private legal regime in Wyoming and supported
it in Texas. The Texans were able to internalize the benefits of private
action; the people in Wyoming could not. This demonstrates that gov-
ernment-provided law can be determinative of the success of private
legal regimes.
The story of the open range cattlemen strongly supports Benson's
analysis of criminal justice issues. As the brief sketch above illustrates,
the key to successful private provision of criminal justice services
rested in the various incentive structures. Where individuals had the
ability to capture the benefits of their efforts at controlling crime, they
were able effectively to provide criminal justice services. Where the
institutional framework created incentives to undermine private ac-
tion, they failed. Failure was not simply enduring a high crime rate,
however. It led to higher levels of violence and rights violations. When
such institutional failure coincided with relatively "cheap" opportuni-
ties to seize state power, it produced a disaster.
The story of the cattlemen also suggests some valuable lessons for
crime control today. The success of the Texas ranches in solving their
crime problem rested on their ability to exclude trespassers from their
property. Not only did this give Texans the means to address the prob-
lem, but it also gave them the incentive to invest in technology that
made exclusion a practical reality as well as a legal possibility. Barbed
wire revolutionized the cattle industry not just by keeping cattle in but
77 Webb, The Great Plains at 498 (cited in note 39).
78 Id at 500.
79 Id at 428.
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by helping keep trespassers out. The Wyoming cattlemen, on the other
hand, could only invest in violence when their attempts to acquire le-
gal title to land peacefully failed.
The current plight of high crime areas such as public housing pro-
jects is, in part, due to a similar failure to allow residents to exclude
criminals and potential criminals from their neighborhoods. Gated
communities provide the well-to-do with the ability to exclude; poor
people need similar mechanisms to allow them to protect their homes
and neighborhoods.
V. POLICIES FOR REAL PRIVATIZATION
The final section of Benson's book addresses two questions: (1)
How did we ever get into such an enormous mess? and (2) What can
we do about it?
The answer to the first question requires an understanding of
criminal law's history. Benson traces the transformation of English
criminal law from a restitution-based, essentially private system be-
fore the Norman conquest to the modern public system (pp 198-211).
The central theme of the story is the Crown's desire to gain new
sources of revenue by transmuting torts into offenses against the
King's peace.
The increasing role of royal officers in prosecuting offenses had
consequences for other parts of the criminal justice system as well
(pp 211-22). The rules of evidence, the development of the criminal
defense bar, plea bargaining, imprisonment, and many other features
of the modern criminal justice system can all be traced to the kings'
gradual displacement of the private system. Thus
[t]he evolution of England's criminal law system was altered by a
long history of direct commands intended to serve the self-
interested goals of kings, their bureaucrats, and politically power-
ful individuals and groups. These changes substantially weakened
private citizens' incentives to participate in voluntary law en-
forcement arrangements and ultimately forced the government
to provide bureaucratic alternatives. The fact that the state has
taken such a prominent role in criminal law is not a reflection of
the superior efficiency of state institutions, but a result of the
state's undermining the incentives for private participation in
criminal law (p 223).
What to do about this state of affairs is more difficult. Benson ar-
gues that the appropriate goal for criminal justice reform is "to ensure
liberty and justice" (p 227). Reorienting the criminal justice system
80 Efficiency is not the primary goal, something that may surprise some readers. A commu-
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around restitution for victims is the means to this end because it also
gets the incentives right for all the participants (p 227)."'
From the normative perspective of liberty, all individuals should
be treated as free and responsible beings as long as they live up
to their responsibilities to others (i.e. respect other people's
property rights). Someone who, in the exercise of free will, inten-
tionally violates another person's property rights through theft or
violence essentially forfeits his own property rights (economic
and civil) until justice is done.... Criminals should lose many of
their own property rights unless and until they have restored the
property they have taken, diminished in value, or destroyed....
[M]aking criminals responsible for their actions should mean
making them responsible to their victims, and refusal to accept
that responsibility should result in loss of all civil and economic
rights (pp 228-29).
This is a far reaching prescription, essentially calling for outlawry for
those who commit crimes and refuse to compensate their victims.
To provide proper incentives and promote justice, the focus must
be on restitution. Prison sentences do not meet this criterion as they
force both the criminal who does the time and taxpayers who foot the
bill to "pay" for the crime, while leaving the victim uncompensated.
"Justice for victims requires more than punishment as negative conse-
quences are reflected onto the criminal. Justice requires that the nega-
tive consequences hould also be deflected away from others. The
criminal alone should pay" (p 232).
Many criminals cannot simply write a check to their victims. Or at
least they cannot write a check that would not bounce. Others lack the
skills necessary to earn enough income to make meaningful restitution
payments. Those in prison lack the opportunity to find work at all.
Understanding how criminals can make restitution requires examining
alternatives to the current prison-based system (pp 232-33). Benson
has a number of suggestions about how this might be accomplished;
the main point is that restitution must become the focus of the system.
A restitution-based system raises a host of problems of its own.
Victims, if given the power to determine how much restitution they
are owed, may behave opportunistically and demand unreasonable
nitarian reviewer, for example, was "surprised by the frequency of [his] own sympathetic reac-
tions." David R. Karp, A Libertarian-Communitarian Bridge?, 10 The Responsive Community 78,
79 (Winter 1999-2000). Benson notes that efficiency is generally a complement to liberty and jus-
tice, but he is clear that when a choice must be made the latter should dominate.
81 While incarceration or retribution could also be provided privately, neither provides ap-
propriate incentive structures. Privately provided incarceration, for example, must depend on
public funding (unless we want to impose yet another cost on victims). As a result it is under-
priced from a victim's point of view, and victims will demand excessive incarceration.
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amounts of restitution (p 236). Many societies have developed institu-
tions that restrain such opportunism. Benson surveys practices from
modern Japan, medieval Iceland, medieval England, Jewish law, and
other sources to gather clues on how this can be accomplished. "The
point is that the rules regarding restitution can be as complex and
fine-tuned as the society wants them to be, and the precise rules that
might evolve in a modern restitution-based system would naturally
depend on the norms of the citizens of that society" (p 240).
Short of a revolution in criminal justice, what can be done to im-
prove on the margins? Benson offers a number of suggestions for
ways in which incremental improvements could be obtained. As else-
where, the focus is on the incentives for the participants in the crimi-
nal justice system. Correcting the disincentives for preventative watch-
ing, for example, could significantly reduce crime at a modest cost
(pp 263-71). Simple things, like assigning police to behave the way
that private security firms do, focused on watching rather than detect-
ing, are a start. Reducing barriers to entry for private security firms, to
lower the cost of watching services, is another straightforward im-
provement. Promoting reporting of crimes by implementing steps that
lower the costs of doing so to victims and witnesses can also help.
Many of these policies are simple and cheap measures-assigning a
single prosecutor to work with a victim throughout the investigation
and prosecution, for example, prevents the cost in time and emotional
energy of requiring the victim repeatedly to educate new personnel
about the crime. Similarly, allowing private prosecutions would in-
crease the number of prosecutions and therefore heighten the prob-
ability of punishment.
Benson's most controversial recommendations have to do with
changes in punishment. Consistent with his focus on restitution, Ben-
son suggests shifting the costs of punishment to criminals by requiring
them to pay for their own supervision (pp 298-99). He also suggests
marketing prison labor to increase criminals' ability to pay restitution
awards (p 299). As Benson recognizes, these proposals are likely to
draw opposition from powerful interest groups.
What will happen if society ignores Benson's recommendations?
Benson offers a surprisingly upbeat assessment: "Privatization will oc-
cur to a large degree anyway" (p 317). The advantages of privatization
and the costs of the failures of the current system have become too
large to ignore. "The choice policymakers face is not between privati-
zation and no privatization. It is between encouraging and supporting
the privatization trend and attempting to thwart it, thereby perhaps
slowing its evolution and diverting its path, but not stopping it"
(pp 317-18).
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As a society we spend a great deal of time and resources on
criminal justice services. Public provision requires a consensus, which
does not exist, on issues from what conduct is criminal to the goals of
incarceration. Bruce Benson's analysis suggests an alternative ap-
proach to these issues. A restitution-based, private criminal justice sys-
tem offers a chance for the victims of crimes to secure justice. It offers
neutral principles that guide the choice of conduct to criminalize. It
promises efficiency in the delivery of the services.
Come the revolution, many interest groups and individuals will
not like the world to which Benson's analysis points. Moralists who in-
sist on criminalizing consensual conduct that does not harm third par-
ties will be disappointed that the law cannot serve as a club against
those with different beliefs. Political pressure groups will be frustrated
that they cannot secure special treatment for their favorite cause.
Those enamored with symbolic politics will be left unfulfilled by the
focus on actual harms. Others will find much to cheer. Victims, and po-
tential victims, of crimes will gain new opportunities for restitution.
Individuals will find new opportunities to create wealth, either as en-
trepreneurs or as investors in, or employees of, entrepreneurs who ful-
fill private roles in the criminal justice system.
Benson's analysis also has much to offer short of a complete
revolution in criminal justice. Understanding the importance of pri-
vate inputs into the public provision of criminal justice services, and
understanding the role of incentives in determining the level of those
inputs, will enable policymakers to improve existing criminal justice
systems. Understanding how privatization efforts affect incentives for
participants, from victims to police to criminals, will enable those ef-
forts to succeed more often. Paying attention to criminal justice's pri-
vate roots is thus critical to reform, whether piecemeal or wholesale.
The book has a larger message as well. This is a case where eco-
nomics has a clear contribution to make to the study of law. The con-
tribution is made without jargon, without mathematical hand waving,
and without the sacrifice of the English language. In short, this is what
economists ought to be doing about law (and other topics). Fortu-
nately, more economists are attempting to write clearly and intelli-
gently about law." Unless economists can reach noneconomists, they
are doomed to speak only to one another. This book makes an excel-
lent start at bringing the insights of economics on criminal justice is-
sues to a wider audience.
82 See, for example, David D. Friedman, Law's Order: What Economics Has to Do with
Law and Why it Matters (Princeton 2000).
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